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I
Civil church law is in essence a study of the relationship between
competing powers. That is not to say that the competition for sover-
eignty in realms common to or overlapping both is antagonistic, in a
deprecatory way. A fundamental Christian theological position is that
the state is a complement to the purposes of the Church,' and also that
the prosperity of the Church is of positive interest to the state.2  Nor
is this conception foreign to political thought and jurisprudence, in-
cluding that which has shaped the American democratic system.' The
word competition is chosen to denote the active interplay between
church government and civil government which flows from the in-
decision existing within and between them as to the proper scope of
their respective domains. There is not now nor has there ever been in
the two thousand year history of the Christian Church common agree-
ment over where to draw the line. The oft-repeated Biblical guide
"Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the
* Associate Professor of Law, New York University.
1 The word "church" will be capitalized when referring to the communion
of believers, or when used as part of the name of a denomination. Otherwise,
lower case is used.
2 Many of the orders about which Christian theologians have written depend
for their identification on both observable fact and the presuppositions and com-
mands of the decalogue. Express references to obligations toward a state are
absent from these ten directives. Nevertheless, there is ample Biblical ground
for the proposition that the state is authority as an order to which all are subject
St. Paul remarks in Romans 13: 1-3, that all "should be subject to the governing
authorities. For there is no authority except from God. . . .For rulers are not a
terror to good conduct, but to bad." The use of the terms "good" and "bad"
clearly inject a quality ingredient requisite to a "power" being "authority," as
does also the referent to which the power owes its status of "authority." In
listing certain virtues of civil government by way of his commentary on Psalm 82,
Luther wrote "that temporal government, next to the preaching office, is the
highest service of [to] God and the most useful office on earth." 13 LUTHER'S
WORKS 51 (American ed. 1956). See also AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD (Mod. Lib. ed.
1950) ; LUTHER, CONCERNING GOOD WORKS; AN ADDRESS TO THE CHRISTIAN NOBIITY
OF THE GERMAN NATION; and especially CONCERNING GOVERNMENT: To WH*.T
EXTENT ONE IS OBLIGATED To OBEY IT, all of which are available in numerous
sources. There are many other references which could be made, not least of which
would be those to Aquinas, who is almost the final word from the Roman Catholic
point of view, and CALVIN'S INSTITUTES, for another Protestant position.
3 Again the citations could be innumerable, though it should be mentioned
that western democracy is in large measure a dissent from authoritarian theology.
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things which are God's" is hardly a definitive aid. There is not much
precision in this, although when reflected upon with the conditions of
the period in which it was uttered in mind, perhaps something of value
as a starting point may be acquired. When Jesus Christ spoke these
words in Jerusalem, he was speaking to citizens of as brutal a govern-
ment as dissidents had ever known. And yet the admonishment was
to "render unto," denoting obedience and respect and submission.
Even the beginner will soon realize that to dip into the tomes of
history and the endless line of decisions in civil and ecclesiastical courts
on inter-church-and-state law is to become immediately involved in the
study of liberty. Freedom of the state from the church, or the church
from the state-the emphasis has shifted from century to century and
country to country-is one thing involved. But the drama of that story
is second to the fascination of following the development of individual
liberty which has been both a catalyst for and a by-product of the
conflict between the two great powers. Often the liberties of the indi-
vidual have been paraded as the chief interest of institutional con-
tenders, but in fact individual liberty was not even thought of. The
freedom of the individual to do as he wills is an easy victim of political
power, whether exercised by church, by state or by another concen-
tration of power. Nor does history indicate that limited liberty is assured
to be better under one authority than under the other, for there is
considerable truth in Lord Acton's maxim that power corrupts and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Church politics and the politics of
civil government have made strange bedfellows.
Thus it is that I approach this subject of church civil law from
the point of view of a government's duty to protect the maximum de-
gree of effective free action by individuals. Along the paths of suc-
ceeding pages there will be presented some "rules of law" as lawyers
like to refer to court decisions, plus a good deal of speculation about
some of them.
II
Religious issues get into the courts in many ways. Reference here
is not to the nature of the action, but rather to the types of disputes
which involve issues touching on religious beliefs, and which for a
resolution require the judgment of the civil judiciary. Two very active
areas are the innumerable problems surrounding domestic relations-
marriage, dissolution of marriage, and adoption-and involving edu-
cation. In both fields participants speak highly of religious liberty and
the separation of church and state.
"Separation of church and state,"--this is a principle of the highest
level abstraction, which means one thing to one person and to another
4 Matthew 22: 21.
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something different. It is at best a title for an idea. It suggests a dis-
position, or several dispositions which vary in their emphasis on what
should fall within the pale of separation and what should not. To
some it may even denote the concept that there can in no way be any
function of the government which aids a church. But immediately,
to be consistent, there must be taken the next step that any govern-
mental actions which are either neutral or repulsive to the interests of
a church are equally anathema. Add to this the fact that the com-
munity is not at all at one concerning what is a church (and here the
word is used in its loosest sense, to mean all religious-indeed, what is
that?- - 5 societies) and the further fact that total inaction may be the
surest way to "aid," and it becomes instantly apparent that "ctotal"
separation, as black may be distinguished from white, is simply not
possible. This would seem so elementary a proposition that it becomes
pedantic to set it forth and yet this writer feels excused in making the
statement in view of some attitudes, judicial and otherwise, which have
been expressed with too much zest.
The entire orbit of church and state conflict is charged with dis-
trust between the contending participants. Much of the apprehension
of for example, the non-Roman Catholic who looks only at the politi-
cal activities of that church is well-founded. History, if it is not made
to forget the trespasses of the Roman Church, records periods of action
wherein the duties entrusted to it were badly administered. Something
of the same may be said with more or less emphasis of almost any
organization which has had an extended existence. The core of histori-
cal Christianity, entrusted to the charge of the Church, is shared by
many denominations of the Christian faith, yet among them there is a
high degree of suspicion of the social action of the various other com-
munions. Much of the furor over public aid to parochial education is
traceable to an honest conviction that if a parent withdraws his child
from the facilities of public education, that is a choice freely exercised
which does not take with it the right to enjoy in a private institution the
same or any of the services provided at public expense in the public in-
stitution, including the generally classed social welfare privileges, such
as bus transportation, free milk, medical services, and the like.' But it
5 The word "religion" properly includes the concept of living in relation to a
higher order, which is not something merely desirable, but which makes demands
upon the life being lived. The element of dependence, and consequently, worship,
is necessary. For the purposes of being a religious society in our legal system,
all of this is not necessary. Ethical groups may qualify as religious societies for
a most important purpose, tax benefits. Fellowship v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.
App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1958), noted in 58 COLUM. L. REv. 417 (1958).
6 See Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Amendment, 14
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 44 (1949), which criticizes the argument that since the
parochial schools perform many of the same functions of public schools, the state
should therefore extend financial support to them.
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is suggested that a significant though rarely articulated ingredient of
the objection predicates itself on the nature of some parochial education,
not so much in that it is administered with a point of view or conviction
in mind, but that distortions are created through a consciously or un-
consciously incorrect presentation of material. With design or without,
mass communication media such as diocesan or church-wide newspapers
and nationally run advertisements are employed to present information
without even the least effort to maintain a reasonable standard of
accuracy. This is a serious ethical irresponsibility, contributing nothing
to a much desired and needed cultural rapprochement among our
national religious groups.
Leo Pfeffer, from a Jewish perspective and that also of a lawyer,
has analyzed the disparity between creeds in terms of competition.7
This has its place, but there are limits to the approbation which should
be given to competition between religious sects, or for that matter
between all groups. Democracy is not merely a system where-in the
strongest components may impose their philosophies on others, though
to influence the social and political culture would surely be proper.
Democracy depends more upon the education of the individual, whose
civic responsibility ought not to be lost by assimilation into national
groups pretending to act for him in every way, be they religious, pro-
fessional, labor, or otherwise. It is not the function of the government
to determine which religious society is "true"; it must allow all to
function. In like fashion, it is not the function of a church to seek laws
proscribing certain conduct which in no demonstrable way can be con-
ceived inimical to the interests of the state. In mind as an example are
those jurisdictions which prevent their citizens from legally pursuing
what to some is a highly intelligent and responsible, and certainly not
conclusively un-Christian course of conduct in planning families, not
so that marriage is made a legalized infamous association, but rather to
the end that the greatest happiness, spiritual and material well-being, and
education can be provided.8 Organizations which take western political
democracy seriously must exercise self-restraint and maintain a distance
from those outside their fold charitably to allow them to choose as they
will.
Religion is deemed by our culture to be a matter of persuasion.
The law cannot compel a citizen's adherence to a religious belief, and
must always protect the privilege of infidelity. While this is a position
compatible with sectarianism, it is not apparent to the writer why it is
not also a distinctly religious position. Does it follow that if God can-
7
PFEFFER, CREEDS IN COMPETITION (1958).
S CoNN. GEN. STAT. tit. 53-32 (1958): "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be
fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more
than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."
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not be avoided, He cannot be refused? The liberal political theory is
often criticized for allegedly substituting reason and conscience for
God. Insofar as this might be a theorist's conviction, it embraces a
head-on conflict with Christianity. However, if in the pure heavens of
theological abstractions everyone is not free to choose his own religion,
why must this deny to the community of people constituting a state the
right or power to endow the state with religious neutrality? Incipient
Christianity depended heavily on a political right to dissent. And is it
not the raison d'etre of Christianity that its God extended to humanity
a choice which was exercised, albeit wrongly? A political structure
which maximizes the opportunities of free choice is, admittedly, pregnant
with certain dangers inimical to the propagation of a given creed. But
competition for the souls and minds of men is something which even
organized Christianity can ill-afford to be without. History is replete
with instances where a relatively unchallenged church lost sight of its
divine responsibility and betrayed its Founder even to the extent of
commercializing the gift of His grace. Jesus Christ did not coerce or
put to death, but was instead crucified for teaching, and while His
crucifixion is viewed by Christians as a function of His redemptive
work, it and the whole course of His life may incidentally but signifi-
cantly serve as an example of social conduct in a pluralistic society. The
medieval concept that where the laws of the church spoke, its courts as
of right should adjudicate is not indispensable to Christian theology, and
is quite contrary to all of American democratic culture, and to more
and more of English history since the English Reformation brought a
desirable halt to centuries of bickering with the pope.1"
III
Religious issues as a generic term includes the types of cases en-
compassed in the above discussion. Through the years much has been
9 E.g, PARSONS, THE FIRST FREEDOM: CONSIDERATIONS ON CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE UNrrED STATES 115 (1948): "[Liberalism] holds as a doctrinal religious
dogma that man owes his sole allegiance to his own reason, none to God, unless
he choose to give it to Him. This is freedom of conscience in the Liberal tradition.
It is freedom from religion, not freedom of religion; it is freedom of conscience as
against God. Freedom of religion is freedom of the individual conscience against
the state, a very different thing. The very reason why man has freedom of
religion against the state is precisely because he has no freedom as against God."
Parsons' conclusions are not acceptable as to the whole of western political
liberalism.
10 Space does not permit reviewing the history of ecclesiastical courts. In
English history their jurisdiction enjoyed a wide range, including clerical ordi-
nation and problems of church polity and ownership, matrimony and related
family matters, wills and administration (this involving one's final act), contracts
under oath, and all civil and criminal actions against clerics. The best history on
the subject is, of course, 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAxV (2d ed.
1904).
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said about them in many places. A narrower pattern of cases is chosen
for the bulk of this article, for two reasons. First, little extended com-
ment is available on those selected, at least nothing comparable to the
volumes which have appeared on God in the schools, the public purse
for private purposes, morals, censorship, and religious issues in domestic
relations. Second, a no less important issue of church and state relation-
ships is involved.
The cases for survey are those which have come to the civil courts
seeking a solution to a dispute which has arisen within a given denomi-
nation, or within the framework of an established congregation.
Generally the dispute arises over a claim for church property, though
less frequently a simple action for reinstatement of membership," for
burial rights,' 2 or for reinstatement of a pastor'3 or officer 14 appears.' 5
Here, as elsewhere in the law, may be found many generalizations.
Countless are the times when courts have said that religious disputes
are not within the jurisdiction of civil courts. This sweeping statement
gets limited to read that a "purely" ecclesiastical or doctrinal issue is
outside the scope of civil court jurisdiction, thereby enabling them to
assume a decision-making function over factions whose property squabbles
are inextricably interwoven with doctrinal undertones. Or to put it
another way, a judge may say that religious disputes which involve
property or civil rights are within the scope of his office.
To the observer who has some acquaintance with comparative
Christianity, the trite judicial guide that a court will not take jurisdiction
of purely ecclesiastical disputes must look amazingly simple. The very
question of what is purely a religious issue is one which could be charged
with religious involvement or implications. Who is to decide what is
solely religious and what is solely or essentially a property dispute? The
court, of course, but the contentions of the litigants frame the issues;
it is their argumentation, their rationale which wraps the garb of
ecclesiastical sanctity around claims involving the interests of the church.
Could the courts ever properly accede to the proposition that to quarrel
with a church is itself a religious issue to be resolved, therefore, solely
by church discipline? And then inexorably apply the decision of the
church tribunal? Granted the suggestion is mere speculation, but some
11 Mt. Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 So. 2d 617
(1949).
12 McQuire v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 54 Hun. 207, 7 N.Y.Supp. 345 (1889).
13 King v. Smith, 106 Kan. 624, 189 Pac. 147 (1920) ; State ex rel. Hynes v.
Holy Roman Apostolic Catholic Church, 183 Mo. App. 190, 170 S.W. 396 (1914).
14 Mt. Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, supra note 11.
15 This article will concentrate on civil jurisdiction over church disputes
largely other than those involving merger activities, except as these are deemed
necessary for setting forth rules bearing on the narrower scope of this paner.
Mergers are discussed elsewhere in this symposium.
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may not think it too exaggerated or absurd, seeing something of a
kernel for such a result in recent cases.
IV
Before looking at some of the recent litigation, a moment should
be spent on examining a venerable old case, ancestral decision to the
rationale emanating from courts in church disputes today. In mind is
Watson v. Jones,'6 which proceeded from the ranks of the Presbyterian
churches, whose peace, as the peace of most institutions, was shaken by
the events of the Civil War. A flurry of cases came from Presbyterian
congregations and formed the nucleus for a considerable contribution
to the law of this area. That church's ecclesiastical organization and
geographical distribution made a perfect blend for giving vent to some
of the ill feelings left in war's wake. Presbyterian congregations
numbered well among southern Christian bodies, especially in Missouri
and Kentucky, where, by virtue of their border position, mixed opinions
flourished.
When the national church, through the General Assembly-
highest church organ, defined Christian social responsibility in terms of
loyalty to the federal government and repulsion toward slavery, it was
like rubbing salt into yet unhealed wounds. A good number of southern
or southern-oriented congregations rebelled. Factions split off; majori-
ties and minorities attempted to pull their congregations out of the
national body. Case upon case was docketed and heard, among them
Watson v. Jones. Arising in Kentucky and destined for Washington,
that case was the genesis of an arduous, tedious, often faltering line of
cases which has constructed a yet unfinished but probably wholesome
framework within which religious societies enjoy a more or less un-
fettered autonomy.
The Louisville Walnut Street congregation of the Presbyterian
Church split over the retention of a pastor, occupancy of that office
being the immediate focal point at which conflicting social views on
slavery were exhibited. A cleavage in the congregation separated those
for and against the determination of the General Assembly. Those
opposing the action of the assembly joined the Louisville Presbytery in
condemning the national body which in turn declared those faithful to
it to be the true presbytery. As each faction made efforts to keep out
their adversaries, final resolve was sought in the courts. By bringing
the action in the name of an Indiana member of the congregation, the
jurisdiction of the federal court was called into service, a tactic hope-
fully calculated to accomplish results more favorable to the national
organ.17
1680 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
17 In the courts of Kentucky, see Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 332
(1867), where the court ruled in favor of the pro-southern faction.
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Better results were forthcoming. The nation's highest forum set
forth its now famous trichotomy of church dispute cases, which, though
not binding on state courts, remained the single most important decision
to emerge in nearly a century of this type litigation. According to the
Court, disputes were of three types:1
1. The first of these is when the property which is the
subject of controversy has been, by the deed or will of the
donor, or other instrument by which the property is held,
by the express terms of the instrument devoted to the teaching,
support, or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine
or belief.
2. The second is when the property is held by a religious
congregation which, by the nature of its organization, is
strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so
far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or
obligation to any higher authority.
3. The third is where the religious congregation or
ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a subordinate
member of some general church organization in which there
are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate
power of control more or less complete, in some supreme
judicatory over the whole membership of that general
organization.
In reference to the first, the Court said that "it would seem . . . to be
the obvious duty of the court ... to see that the property so dedicated
is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use."' 1
Proper organizational succession through elected officers or majority
control, as the case may be, was the key criterion in the quest for a
solvent to questions of the second grouping. But as to the third, the
Court said:2
In this class of cases we think the rule of action which
should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound
view of the relations of church and state under our system of
laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial
authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided
by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions
as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the
case before them.
18 Watson v. Jones, So U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
19 Id. at 723.
2 0 Id. at 727. The Court acknowledged a contrary rule in England, assigning
by way of explanation the fact of an established church.
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V
Of the overwhelming body of litigation which has arisen from
church disputes, that series involving the Russian Orthodox church of
Saint Nicholas in New York City stands supreme. With political under-
tones, with state judicial and state legislative involvement, with a federal
Supreme Court pronouncement, with disputes both property and re-
ligious, with all of these and more, spanning the years of several decades,
it is a veritable showcase of the problems under analysis. It would be
well to pause for a full review of that contest.
The facts of this case can get rather unwieldy, but those necessary
for a mental picture of the discord may be stated as follows. 21 A
building for the congregation of St. Nicholas of the Russian Orthodox
church was constructed in New York City in 1903, with a corporation
of the same name holding title. Gifts, both foreign and domestic, and
from the mother church in Moscow, were used for its erection. Dedi-
cated to the use of the New York congregation, it achieved the status
of a cathedral in 1905 when the See of the Russian Orthodox diocese
of North America and the Aleutian Islands was transferred from
San Francisco to New York.
Clouds formed over the calm of the maturing congregation's ex-
istence when revolutions were also changing scenery in the homeland.
Following the collapse of the czarist regime, a great convention of the
world-wide Russian Orthodox Church was held during 1917-18. The
patriarchate2 2 was reestablished for the first time since Peter the Great
forbade elections to that office and formed in its stead the Most Sacred
Governing Synod in 1700. The newly elected Patriarch Tikhon be-
came arch-prelate and head of church administrative affairs. He was
the supreme church authority, solely vested with power to convene the
church in its great conventions, called sobors.
Kerensky had authorized the 1917-1918 sobor. But his short-lived
regime capitulated in the Bolshevik "October Revolution" of the same
21 St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America
v. Fedchenkoff, 192 Misc. 327, 77 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd sub nom.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America v.
Kedroff, 276 App. Div. 309, 94 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1950), re 'd, 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d
56 (1950), rev'd and remanded, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), new trial ordered, 306 N.Y. 38,
114 N.E.2d 197 (1953), dismissed sub nom. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church of North America v. Kreshik, 9 Misc. 2d 1069, 166 N.Y.S.2d
245 (1957). The above reports contain variously extended statements of the facts,
the best appearing in 302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950). Briefs were kindly made
available to the writer by the general counsel for the Russian Orthodox Church in
North America, Mr. Ralph Montgomery Arkush, of the New York bar.
22The term "partriarch" has no single meaning, even when used in con-
nection with religious organizations. In the Eastern Confession of the Christian
Church, he is the head of a given church body, but does not claim any power of
doctrinal infallibility, such as has been developed in connection with the Roman
Catholic pope, who is patriarch of the Latin rite of that communion.
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year. Difficulties mounted. Church property was confiscated, clergy
were liquidated and the patriarch was put under house arrest, a con-
dition which continued for several years until he was imprisoned.23 In
November of 1920, Tikhon issued a ukase, or letter of instructions, to
diocesan bishops providing in part that "if the highest church adminis-
tration . . . would for any reason discontinue their church adminis-
trative activity," the bishop, either alone or with neighboring dioceses
where possible, should "assume full hierarchical power."
24
When Patriarch Tikhon's imprisonment took place in 1922, a
group of priests declared themselves the supreme authority of the
church and summoned a sobor for 1923. This convention became
known as the sobor of the "Living" or "Renovated" church, whose
uncanonical status was not at all times, nor by all parties admitted, as
the ensuing disputes were to sojourn through American courts.
Tikhon's lot at this sobor was by no standards desirable, for exe-
cration and villification were heaped upon him. Reviled and denounced
as an apostate and traitor, he was unfrocked, and the patriarchate again
was dissolved.
Something of the communist control and influence imposed on the
Russian Orthodox Church may be inferred from comments in the
minutes of the 1923 sobor. The now trite propaganda contrast between
capitalist exploiters and the worker proletariat classes was paraded before
Christians with the admonishment that passive indifference was sinful.
The sobor declared capitalism to be a mortal sin, and its eradication a
holy goal.25
The American echoes of this Babylonian captivity of the Russian
Church manifested themselves in a severe dash between Russian Ortho-
dox recognition of the Soviet dominated hierarchy and those not taking
such a step. The first legal move was made as early as 1918, when a
priest,26 John Kedrovsky, of the Russian Orthodox Church sued the
231patriarch Tikhon was released from prison in 1923, but was thereafter
confined to a monastery where he died in 1925. 302 N.Y. at 11, n. 3, 96 N.E.2d at
60, n. 3.24 d at 7, 96 N.E.2d at 58.
25 The resolution read that the "All-Russian Local Sobor of the Orthodox
Church testifies before the face of the Church and all mankind that at present
the world has divided itself into two classes: capitalists-exploiters and proletariat,
with whose labor and blood the capitalist world is building its welfare.
"In the whole [world] only the Soviet Government of Russia went into
battle with that social evil. The Christians cannot be indifferent spectators of that
battle. The Sobor declares capitalism to be a mortal sin, and a battle with
capitalism to be holy to Christians. In Soviet Authorities the Sobor sees a world's
leader for fraternity, equality, and peace of nations. The Sobor stigmatizes the
international and national counter-revolution and condemns it with all its religious
and moral authority." Brief for Appellee to Supreme Court pp. 12-13.
26 Throughout its briefs, the American church faction referred to Kedrovsky
as an "agent."
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managing and advisory group of the North American diocese, chal-
lenging the claim of Alexander Nemolovsky to the chair of archbishop.
A receiver of church property throughout the continent was appointed. 27
Kedrovsky buttressed his demands a few years later when he was able
to procure from the 1923 sobor documents purporting to consecrate him
archbishop of the North American diocese and to excommunicate the
new Archbishop, Platon Rojdesvensky. Thus armed, Kedrovsky confi-
dently commenced another action2" in 1924 which for the initial in-
stance clearly set before the New York courts rival claimants to
ecclesiastical office and possession of the Cathedral of St. Nicholas.
Round one of this encounter went to Platon, as the supreme court
ruled that peaceful occupancy for more than three successive years was
a defense to an action of ejectment. But the battle was first beginning.
At the time Kedrovsky was pursuing his claims to Russian Ortho-
dox Church property in America, a national convention was called by
the American diocese for April 2-4, 1924, in Detroit. The summoning
of this convention was precipitated by the announced excommunication
of Platon and its ensuing confusion. At this Detroit sobor, the Russian
Orthodox Church in America2 9 was established and administrative inde-
pendence from the hierarchy in Moscow was declared. The new
authorities retained St. Nicholas Cathedral of New York City as its
central see. It is the personnel of this Russian Orthodox Church in
America who continue until this day a struggle to maintain the right to
worship in and occupy the St. Nicholas Cathedral.
Previously it was mentioned that not in all stages of these en-
counters did the parties to it concede the uncanonical status of the
so-called "Living" or "Renovated" church, child of the 1923 sobor.
Indeed, it was imperative for Kedrovsky in both his 1918 and 1924
actions to rely on canonicity. The reason for noting this point is that it
underscores the difficulty of dryly following the logic of a rule, in this
instance the rule of Watson v. Jones."
Whatever else was contested in the above actions, neither party
disputed the hierarchical attributes of the Russian Church. As such, it
was clearly a case for Watson v. Jones, category three. And so the
27The action, involving deeds to 135 church properties in 19 states and
Alaska, was titled Kedrovsky v. Archbishop and Consistory of the Russian Ortho-
dox Greek Catholic Church, 218 App. Div. 121, 217 N.Y.Supp. 873 (1926) rev'd,
249 N.Y. 75, 162 N.E. 587 (1928).
28Kedrovsky v. Rojdesvensky, 123 Misc. 159, 204 N.Y.Supp. 442 (Sup. Ct.
1924), re'v'd, 214 App. Div. 483, 212 N.Y.Supp. 273 (1925), aff'd per curiam, 242
N.Y. 547, 152 N.E. 421 (1926). It was this opinion which found the 1923 Sobor
to be proper and canonical.
29 The establishing resolution provided for autonomy and subordination to its
own elected archbishop, but stated that not all spiritual ties with the mother
church, for which it should always pray, would be broken.
3OSupra note 16.
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court thought when the 1924 action was appealed. 31 All the testimony
in favor of Platon was that his standing as archbishop depended on an
oral order of Tikhon, but oral, be it noted, because of the strained
political conditions under which the prelate operated. Kedrovsky, on
the other hand, was able to show written confirmation of his appoint-
ment by the 1923 sobor, which Platon vainly assaulted as uncanonical.
The court concluded: "the Patriarch had no power to appoint an Arch-
bishop, and since in any event an oral appointment would be invalid,3"
[Platon's] title does not seem to be well proven, nor is the claim of
recognition by various persons who have no right of appointment any
proof of authority to act as Archbishop in this diocese, and thus to
administer the trust in the real property herein involved." 3
If the virtue of a law is found in its ease of application the in-
gredient was present in this decision. It was quite simple, the torpid
path of logic from Watson v. Jones to Platon's defeat. But the dissent
would seem to have extracted from the testimony the real crux of the
case, and at the same time afforded support to those who fear the
legalistic application of lifeless legal formulas. Certainly the decision
would be agreed unjust if the dissent were correct when it remarked :34
• ..He [Kedrovsky] is the servant of a group who have
reached a position of power in their church organization
through the revolution in Russia and by what appears to be
questionable means. It is extraordinary that they should have
the aid of a court of equity to displace those who are ad-
ministering the trust strictly as it was intended to be
administered.
Ironically, the uncanonical status of the 1923 sobor and the
Renovated Church which it created, was conceded in an action initiated
in 1945 against the successors in interest of Kedrovsky.3" By this time,
several intervening moves of importance had been taken. The cathedral
had been incorporated in 1925 and title transferred to the corporation.
Kedrovsky died in 1934, but his son Nicholas Kedroff took up oc-
cupancy of the property, and remained until his demise in 1944, when
another brother John Kedroff continued occupancy as "priest." 3" Of
two outstanding developments in the intervening years, however, one
was the 1927 Soviet permission for the Patriarchal Church to reopen
its central office. But the policy of the new church authorities in
31214 App. Div. 483, 212 N.Y.Supp. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
321d. at 487, 212 N.Y.Supp. at 276, citing INDEX CANONuM, 33D APOSTOLIC
CANON.
33 Id. at 487-88, 212 N.Y.Supp. at 276-77.
34 Id. at 490, 212 N.Y.Supp. at 279.
35 Supra note 21. The premise for this concession was that the 1923 sobor
was not ecumenical, that is, world wide.
36There was grave doubt even in the mind of John Kedroff about his status
as a priest. See 302 N.Y. at 20, 96 N.E.2d at 66.
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Moscow demanded from clergy and laity alike loyalty to the Soviet
government, a condition of full communion with the mother church of
Moscow existing even now. Benjamin Fedchenkoff was in 1933 ap-
pointed by the Moscow authorities as archbishop of the Aleutian Islands
and North America. Decently and in good order allegiance to the
Soviet government was denied by the American church. Because of this,
the nearly ten year old proclamation of autonomy was ruled an act
rudely violative of church discipline, and the American faithful were
unilaterally declared schismatic on August 16, 1933.
Platon died in 1934, and the American Church elected its own
ruling bishop, Theophilus Pashkovsky of Chicago."7 All subsequent at-
tempts at full communion have failed because of the refusal of the
Moscow authorities to relax this obviously political requirement.
The second principal event was the enactment by the New York
Legislature of a law"s which declared the Russian Orthodox Church
of North America to be the Russian Orthodox Church of corporate
standing. The statute became effective on April 10, 1945. It did not
outwardly purport to transfer title to the cathedral from one body to
another, but it did establish a basis for a new attempt by the Russian
Orthodox group rejecting Moscow supremacy to regain possession of
the cathedral. The new action was started on the 9th of April, 1945.
37The authority of the American-elected Bishop Theophilus to direct the
affairs of the church was upheld in Waipa v. Kushwara, 259 App. Div. 483,
20 N.Y.S.2d 174, app. den. 283 N.Y. 780, 28 N.E.2d 417 (1940).
38Religious Corporations Law, Article 5-C, effective April 10, 1945, reads
in part: § 105. "The 'Russian Church in America' . . . refers to that group of
churches . . .of the Eastern Confession . . .which were known as (a) Russian
American Mission of the Russian Orthodox Church from in or about seventeen
hundred ninety-three to in or about eighteen hundred seventy; (b) Diocese of
Alaska and the Aleutian Islands of the Russian Orthodox Church from in or
about eighteen hundred seventy to in or about nineteen hundred four; (c) Diocese
of North America and the Aleutian Islands (or Alaska) of the Russian Orthodox
Church from in or about nineteen hundred four to in or about nineteen hundred
twenty-four; and (d) Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of North America
since in or about nineteen hundred twenty-four; and were subject to the adminis-
trative jurisdiction of the Most Sacred Governing Synod in Moscow until or about
nineteen hundred seventeen, later the Patriarchate of Moscow, but now constitute
an administratively autonomous metropolitan district created pursuant to reso-
lutions adopted at a general convention (sobor) of said district held at Detroit,
Michigan, on or about or between April second to fourth, nineteen hundred
twenty-four.
"A 'Russian Orthodox church' . .. is a church, cathedral . .. or other
religious organization founded and established for the purpose and with the
intent of adhering to, and being subject to administrative jurisdiction of said
mission, diocese or autonomous metropolitan district herein above defined as the
Russian Church in America. (New matter italics, L. 1948, c. 711, § 1, eff. March
31, 1948).
§ 107.(1) "Every Russian Orthodox church in this state, whether incorpo-
rated before or after the creation of said autonomous metropolitan district ...
1959] RELIGIOUS ISSUES
Opinions3" from the New York trial court through those of the United
States Supreme Court are in each instance interesting reading, but
brevity compels moving directly to that of the highest Court, which
reversed the New York disposition of the case that had been in favor
of the claimant Russian Church in America. But first a comment on
the status of the case as it was when it proceeded to the Supreme Court.
More than five years after commencing the action and nearly three
years from the date of decision in trial term, the court of appeals of
New York ruled4" for the American church on the ground that the new
legislative provision was not violative of the federal constitution as
repugnant to the religious establishment clause. 4 But it also observed
that a common law ground existed upon which the decision could be
predicated, namely, whether or not the revival of the patriarchate in
Moscow had been a political move. "If the Moscow patriarchal throne
has been resurrected by the Soviet Government solely as a means of
influencing opinion at home and abroad, and if it may now operate on
an international scale, not as a true religious body, but only as an ex-
shall recognize and be and remain subject to the jurisdiction and authority of...
the Russian Orthodox Church in America ....
39 Supra note 21.
40302 N.Y. 1, 96 N.E.2d 56 (1950). The pilgrimage of Article 5-C in the
lower courts was not without obstruction. Trial term (192 Misc. 327, 77 N.Y.S.2d
333 (1948)) ruled that the act amounted simply to a recognition of the American
Russian Orthodox Church, but as a separate entity, without reference to ownership
in the property interests of the Russian Orthodox Diocese of North America and
The Aleutian Islands.
Much of the same interpretation was rendered in the appellate division,
(276 App. Div. 309, 94 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1950)) which was disturbed by the consti-
tional implications of the plaintiff's suggestion that the statute be read to mean
that the right to possession and use of the church properties "continues" in the
American Church. "It should not be construed to mean that the legislature has
taken sides in the religious controversy as to the right of autonomy. . . .Such a
construction would show an intent by the legislature to interfere in ecclesiastical
concerns which is hardly within the competence of legislative action .... We can
find no suggestion in the present Article of any intention to transfer any beneficial
interest of a religious trust in the St. Nicholas .Cathedral to the "Russian Orthodox
Church in America" contrary to the wishes of the supreme ecclesiastical authority
of the beneficiary church." Id. at 316-17, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59. A dissent took
the position, later to emerge with significance, that "instead of being schismatic,
the group in America to which plaintiff belongs is adhearing, insofar as possible,
to the Orthodox tradition, from which the Russian high church authorities departed
when, yielding to force, they accepted what might be termed the Russian Orthodox
Church of the Communist Obedience." Id. at 322, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 463. On Article
5-C, the dissent said that it was constitutional, and that the majority had construed
it too narrowly in saying that it merely recognized the existence of the American
Church group.
41 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof... ." U.S. CoNsr. amend I. Made applicable
to states through the fourteenth amendment. See e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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tension or implementation of Russian foreign policy, then it is dear
that the North American metropolitan district and not the appointee or
ambassador of the central authorities in Moscow, is the proper trustee
to manage for the benefit of the faithful in this hemisphere those re-
ligious temporalities dedicated to the use of the Russian Orthodox
Mission and Diocese prior to 1924 when it became an administratively
autonomous metropolitan district."42
When the case was at last argued in the nation's highest tribunal,
Kedroff and the Russian alignment pounded away at the proposition that
article 5-C was an undue infringement into church affairs. Strategically,
this move was sound, though it had no precedent in any case on point.
It was also a successful maneuver, for the Supreme Court agreed that
5-C was unconstitutional. It read the statute to mean that all Russian
Orthodox churches in New York, founded before or after the year
1924, had through the Russian Orthodox Church in North America
declared their autonomy from the Moscow patriarchate, and that the
legislative recognition of this had the effect of transferring4 3 control of
the New York churches from the central governing hierarchy of
Russia to the North American synod. This the Court said was un-
constitutional. "It prohibits in this country the free exercise of religion.
Legislation that regulates church administration, the operation of the
churches, the appointment of clergy, by requiring conformity to church
statutes adopted at a general convention . . . prohibits the free exercise
of religion." 44 The Court viewed the provision as displacing "by fiat"
one church with another. "It intrudes for the benefit of one segment
of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious
freedom contrary to the principles of the first amendment."
45
VI
There are several points to be noted about the Court's reasoning.
First, the appeal to religious freedom. That argument is quite as valid
to the American Church group as to the defendant Kedroff Russian
alliance. It is granted by all parties that religious freedom is to be
protected, but the crux of the problem is how and by what and whose
freedom? That of a "church"? Or the group of persons which makes
up the physical church? The support which the Moscow oriented group
of the Russian Orthodox Church received from American Russian
Orthodox believers was exceedingly small, for nowhere does it appear
that anything less than 80 per cent of Russian Orthodox Christians of
American parishes were behind the maneuvers of the American group.
There is some indication from the facts that while there was not unani-
42 302 N.Y. at 22, 96 N.E.2d at 67.
43 Supra note 40.
44 344 U.S. 94, at 107-08.
4 5 Id. at 119.
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mous approval of the breach with the Moscow hierarchy, there was
except for the Moscow appointed clerics no affirmative adherence to the
Russian organizational authority.4 6 If such are the facts of any given
case, it becomes apparent that a dry adherence to denominational au-
thority and supremacy may, as indeed it has,47 result in a denomination
with a shrine, a shrine without worshipers, and worshipers without a
shrine. There is hardly anything functional about a decision with these
consequences.
Maybe functionalism is irrelevant if the concept of church and
state separation is to develop along lines absolutistic. There is certainly
some merit to the position that a culture must proceed from certain basic
propositions, and that decisions are to conform to the prescriptions, even
though in the process someone may occasionally be injured. Common
agreement, however, is rarely achieved concerning the consequences
which are congruous with a given cultural principle. Opposing interests
often conceive, as they did here, their solutions to be consonant with
developing principles of religious liberty in the United States.
The precise ruling of the Court was that the New York legislative
attempt to transfer property from one church faction to another must
fail because afoul of the federal constitutional provisions respecting free-
dom of religion. That there was constitutional ground for arguing the
invalidity of the Article 5-C may be true,4" but whether this position
ought to have been predicated upon the non-establishment clause is an-
other matter. Particularly is this true since the broader reading of the
4 6 The American group was described as "comprising at least four fifths of
the Russian Orthodox churches in the United States. . . ." 276 App. Div. 309,
322, 94 N.Y.S.2d 453, 464 (1950). Uncontested statements appearing in the brief
for appellee on appeal to the Supreme Court (p. 103) were to the effect that there
was no Russian Orthodox church in New York desiring to recognize the adminis-
trative jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate. However, numerical division is
not of significance in schisms involving congregations submitting to a centrally
organized church hierarchy. See ZOLLMANN, American Civil Church Law, 77
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC LAw Ch. 7
(1917).
47 Frequently, the laws of a denomination will provide that property of a
member unit which attempts to withdraw will revert to the judicatory immediately
superior. For instance, By-Law 16 of the Evangelical and Reformed Church
provides that "If a Congregation or a Synod withdraws from the jurisdiction of
the Evangelical and Reformed Church, the property of said congregation or
Synod shall revert to the charge and control of the Judicatory immediately above,
in the case of a congregation to the Synod, and of a Synod to the General Synod."
THE CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAws OF THE EVANGELICAL AND REFORMED CHURCH, as
amended, 1956. Denominational executives have expressed dissatisfaction with
such provisions, because "in litigation based on such a clause, even though a
denomination can sustain its claim, it usually wins nothing more than an empty
building." Letter from Rev. James E. Wagner, President, Evangelical and
Reformed Church, dated March 2, 1959. The letter states also that present merger
efforts are proceeding with the intention of discarding any such reversion clauses.
48 See infra at 529.
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decision is that not only was the New York statute, or any like it, invalid,
but that courts must accept as final the adjudication of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal. As the Court phrased it:49
Ours is a government which by the "law of its being"
allows no statute, state or national that prohibits the free exer-
cise of religion. There are occasions when civil courts must
draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for
the disposition or use of property. Even in those cases when
the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the
church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule
controls. This under our Constitution necessarily follows in
order that there may be free exercise of religion.
There are difficulties here especially with the Court's attitude on
the Constitutional imperative. If the decision is read in the perspective
of early cases involving church property disputes, it becomes clear that
there is in it a considerable change from previous cases. In the first
place, the Watson v. Jones case above discussed was not one on consti-
tutional law."° Further, without any suggestion of a constitutional in-
fraction, jurisdictions have in the past required reconciliation of church
discords by democratic process. This was true, for example in Penn-
sylvania.5 While at first blush this may not appear inconsistent with the
present ruling, in fact such decisions or statutes would seem now on
constitutional analysis foreclosed, for to require disposition of a church
dispute by any legislatively prescribed process would be to deny validity
to a decree of an ecclesiastical tribunal attained through the decisional
process established by the custom or law of a given church society.
5 2
49 344 U.S. at 120-21.
50 The Supreme Court admitted this: "The opinion [of Watson v. Jones]
did not turn on either the establishment or the prohibition of the free exercise of
religion." 344 U.S. at 110.
51 Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 328, Sec. 7: ". • property . . . bequeathed,
devised or conveyed . . . for the use of any church, congregation, or religious
society . . . shall not be otherwise taken and held or enure, than subject to the
control and disposition of the lay members . . . according to the rules . . . of the
religious society shall belong. . . ." Repeated by Act of June 20, 1935, P.L. 353,
sec. 1, which was held constitutional in Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of Hermits
of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 191 At. 140 (1937), and Post v. Dougherty, 326 Pa.
97, 191 Aft. 151 (1937), noted in 4 U. Prrr. L. REv. 76 (1937). The 1855 statute
was in essence a codification of the common law decision in Maceirinas v. Chesna,
299 Pa. 70, 149 Atl. 94 (1930). See also Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 233 Pa. 138,
81 At. 938 (1911) where the court declared against public policy a resolution of
a congregation that the Roman Catholic bishop hold all property in conformance
with the laws and usages of the Roman Catholic Church.
52 Christian theology teaches that the authority of the Church proceeds from
the Triune God. But Christian communions differ in the conceptions of how
authority is expressed in organizational policy. Roman Catholic theology denies
to the laity any authority in the discipline or structure of the church. Evangelical
Lutheran theology puts less stress on outward form, so that the world's Lutheran
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Other instances may be recalled to demonstrate that civil courts did not
deem themselves constitutionally incapable of adjudicating church dis-
putes, even when ecclesiastical tribunals had spoken. Classic examples
are the cases which cavalierly refused to apply the rules of Watson v.
Jone., M4
As lawyers well know, the Constitution and what it meant in 1787
has before been altered at the hands of Supreme Court justices. There-
fore the preceding criticism for all its validity is rendered somewhat
paralytic by precedent. But the court of 1953 had earlier opportunities
to reflect upon its concept of religious liberty, of separation of church
and state, and it might be well to recall them to test the Court's
consistency.
The sweeping decision, and one which caused rumblings of many
sorts was McCollum v. Bd. of Educ5 4 It will be remembered that
there the Court ruled unconstitutional the utilization of Illinois tax-
supported public school buildings to enable groups to give religious in-
struction to public school pupils. Justice Black reiterated his earlier
stand" that neither state nor the federal government could establish a
church or pass laws which aid one religion, all religions, or prefer one
over the other. Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor was invoked,
indeed was exceedingly taxed when Justice Frankfurter added that
"[s]eparation means separation," "eternal separation," clear, distinct,
not that of a "fine line easily overstepped." 6
Nobody seems quite sure what all is meant by the McCollum words.
The point to observe here is that it was very prophylactic in tone. What-
ever may be said of the historical justification for its exaggerated
position-and there is considerable evidence that the framers of the
Constitution did not mean all of that 5 7 -it nevertheless is what the
bodies are variously structured. Extremely opposed to the Roman Church's position
is that of the Baptists, who regard autonomy and self-determination as alone
theologically correct.
53 See, e.g., Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873); Olear v. Haniak, 235
Mo. App. 299, 731 S.W.2d 375 (1939) ; Kreker v. Shirey, 163 Pa. 534, 30 Atd.
440 (1894). The Court limited Watson v. Jones a few years later when it said
an obvious usurper in ecclesiastical office would not be permitted to control church
property. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
54 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
5 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). This and the McCollum
case, supra note 54, have received endless comment, and there is no intention here
to add another. Among the better reflections on the cases are those in a symposium
on Religion and the State, 14- LAw & CONTENMP. PROB. (1949).
5
•The full quotation is: "Separation means separation, not something less.
Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks
of a 'wall of separation,' not of a fine line easily overstepped. . . . 'The great
American principle of eternal separation' . . . is one of the vital reliances of our
Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people stronger than our
diversities." 333 U.S. at 231.
57Professor Edward S. Corwin has given a short and incisive comment on
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Court in its exegesis said is the thrust of the concept of religious liberty
under our political system. On the other hand, and in the context of
the same principle, Kedroff, as broadly construed, gives religious societies
an institutional liberty, an autonomy in .limited but important fields. It
is a sovereignty clothed with constitutional sanctity, beyond the reach of
state activities by a religious society.5" One may be excused if the in-
consistency confounds, for in the name of separation, it is a gigantic
leap with a bundle of aid. In view of the overly platitudinous character
of the Mcollum decision, perhaps the incongruity is not surprising.
Without disparaging critical intent, it is observed that the Kedroff
reasoning as a legal principle is of inestimable value to churches as such,
especially those organized centrally. Conjointly, it is accommodating to
certain extensions of the Christian theological position that the Church
looks to Christ, not to the state, for authority for its existence. The
Church as the communio sanctorum, does, according to Christian dia-
lectics, exist despite the state.59" But when this dogma is thrust into the
arena of practical political issues of jurisdiction, as between an organized
church and the state, there is no common agreement as to what the
precise position of a church is. Church authority is spoken of as two-
fold: to teach 0 and to govern.0 ' The latter is its authority of juris-
diction encompassing its members who are by it to be governed in the
interest of the Church. Some Christian bodies through their emphasis
on this function and favored by the political culture of the time, have
erected detailed legal systems.
Now of course to say that the Church has a governing authority
or office does not mean much until certain concrete issues are met. As
a statement of a principle it is sufficiently vague so as to be susceptible
of vanishing into political nothingness. If when translated into practical
meaning for practical men it signifies that the state has no jurisdiction
over disputes between members of an organized church, or over conflicts
the Court's characterization of the concept of separation of church and state as
applied to state governments through judicial interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, in the Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3 (1949).
58 The Court conceded that "legislative power to punish subversive action
cannot be doubted." 344 U.S. 109. In view of the preemption conflict existing over
state and federal espionage laws, however, the Court's concession is not neces-
sarily very meaningful. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956),
and Collings, Criminal Law and Administration, 1957 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
AMERICAN LAW 93, 94.
59 As an historical organization, the Church is subject to secular law. But
as a total organism, it is the body of Christ (Ephesians 1: 23) which, though
persecuted, exists without authority from the state. An excellent discussion of "The
Church and the Forces of History" appears in ELERT, THE CHRISTIAN ETHos, ch. 10,
(1957) translated from the German, Das Christliche Ethos (1949).
00 Matthew 28: 19.
61 Matthew 18: 18.
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between the members of a church and the church itself, or that the
jurisdiction of the state is simply to formalize ("to apply") the decisions
of an ecclesiastical tribunal, 0 then clearly competition with state politi-
cal authority is implicated. To such hermeneutics, the accommodating
merits of the Supreme Court Kedroff decision are patent.
That the decision is suitable for church purposes is not in itself
improper. On the contrary, and the law in this country has been no
barrier to orderly church administration. Allow one more observation
to be made, however. If the authority of a church tribunal is from its
members, presumably the source of the authority can revoke, modify,
or otherwise affect it. Such governing power proceeds from consent,
and as such would justify a civil court's enforcement of church decrees
on contractual grounds. Voluntarily associated persons ought to be able
to set forth the rules which govern them in their organization. If,
however, the authority asserted by the ecclesiastical powers is dependent
on an alleged commission from Divinity exclusive of lay expression,
63
02This jurisdictional approach is suggested in a series of articles, titled
Separation of Church and State in Restatement of Inter-Church-and-State Common
Law, appearing in 5 JURIST 73 (1945), 6 JuRIST 503 (1946), and 7 JURIST 259
(1947). The authors, writing in the publication of the School of Canon Law of
the Catholic University of America, advocate a conflicts of laws approach to
cases where church law and civil law are on a given issue different. Therefore,
in a civil action which would involve, let us say, a Roman Catholic party or
parties, the civil court would apply the law of the Roman Catholic Church,
looking to the canon law of that denomination. In criticizing the decisions of the
Supreme Court which have declared unconstitutional statutes making it an offense
for one peddling religious wares to refuse to leave the private premises upon the
request of the owner, the authors maintain that the Jehovah's Witness legislature
could not impose duties on members of other religious bodies, for lack of juris-
diction. Therefore, the authors state that the decision that Jehovah's Witnesses
have the right under religious liberty to go on the property of others to preach or
play records is incorrect. (See Grace Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
The property being a company owned town.) Similarly, the authors go on, "if
priests of the Roman Catholic Church entered upon the land of another for the
purpose of exercising their religion by administering spiritual goods, and ob-
jections were made thereto by the State or individual citizens, resulting in court
proceedings, secular courts could not look to the so-called 'freedom of religion'
clause of the first amendment to determine whether or not the priests had the
right so to do. Secular courts would first have to look to the Codex Iuris Canonici,
the law of the (Roman) Church, to discover what rights had been conferred and
what duties imposed, in these respects, by the Church; and, secondly, would have
to determine whether or not the State will recognize the asserted rights as valid,
under the principles of Inter-Church-and-State Common Law." 6 JURIST at 519.
63 It is not being suggested that the authority of the Church proceeds from
its members. As a revealed religion, Christianity depends upon Revelation for its
doctrine and authority. However, most theologians agree that doctrinal issues are
of unequal significance. One obvious area is how church government is manifested
over the temporal assets of the churches. There is nothing inconsistent with the
principle that Church authority to govern its property, though of Divine com-
mission, may be exercised in response to legitimate desires of its members, and
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the power is theoretically free-wielding, limited only by divine law
(which in turn is defined by the ecclesiastical authority) and potentially
insulated from the demands and desires of those affected by the exercise
of that authority. Under the broad interpretation of the Kedroff ruling,
a state would be powerless to respond to misgivings which its citizens
may have after reflecting on the potentials of this theorem.
Another point to note is that no exigencies of the case drove the
Court into the corner of illogic. By choice or quite unwittingly it alone
was responsible, for an excellent foundation avoiding inconsistent con-
sequences under the religious liberty principles of previous decisions was
available. In the opening sentence of his concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter remarked that "a legislature would not have the power
merely because the property belongs to a church" to "displace the
judicial process and decide a particular controversy affecting property"
so as to decree that one party rather than the other "owns it or is
entitled to its possession." 4 Of course. It is not the job of the legis-
lature to determine a litigious issue by statute, let alone by one which
transfers property. Once the Court took the position that Article 5-C
"transferred" ownership from one party to another, enough was said to
condemn the statute, 5 without getting into the murky waters of re-
ligious freedom. To this the only apparent counter argument would
have been that no "transfer" took place, that the statute only "con-
tinued" the property in the previous owners; but this was precisely the
position which the Court rejected by concluding that there was a
transfer."6 Some would hope that when bases other than religious free-
dom are available, the latter would be by-passed, to take its turn when
others fail.
indeed this is the approach of, for instance, the presbyterian form of church
government. The Roman Church rules out a representative government by
believing its priesthood as alone commissioned with authority. See CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA, Title Church (1908).
64 344 U.S. 94, 121.
65 Cases involving descent of property have frequently said that a legislature
has no power to transfer a vested property interest from one to another. This is
a due process concept under the state and federal constitutions, and, though com-
plex and with many ramifications, it would seem to have been useful in the context
of the Kedroff case. Schumacker v. Chapin, 228 S.C. 77, 88 S.E.2d 874 (1955);
Muldow v. Caldwell, 173 S.C. 243, 175 S.E. 501 (1934). "It seems to us that a
statute which declares in terms, and without more, that the full and exclusive use
of a described piece of land, which is now in A., shall be and is hereby vested in
B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of his property without due process of law,
within the meaning of the constitutional provision." Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877).
66It has been held constitutional to repeal a statute, which required church
property to be held subject to the control of its members in favor of an act
requiring it to be held according to the rules of the church, even if the rules vest
complete control in church hierarchy, the argument being that under the repealed
statute no property rights vested in the members. Canovaro v. Brothers of Order
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VII
When the Kedroff case was back in the Court of Appeals of
New York, a decision 6 was handed down which in some measure
diluted the impact of the Supreme Court reasoning. It has been ob-
served on an earlier page68 that the initial New York Court of Appeals
rationale bottomed itself on Article 5-C, but that the court acknowl-
edged a common law approach also to be available. That recognition
assumed importance at this juncture, for after examining and deter-
mining what it considerd to be the scope and effect of the Supreme
Court decision the court invoked the aid of its previous analysis. The
Supreme Court, it said, resolved nothing beyond the constitutionality
of Article 5-C, for its decision "repeatedly returned to the theme that
the statute in question . . . was beyond the legislative power of the
state of New York and violated the Constitution rule against prohibition
of the free exercise of religion." 69 From this perspective of the Supreme
Court ruling, it was a simple step for the court to reject the idea that
Watson v. Jones had been elevated to constitutional status, and to
argue :70
Whatever other limitations have been or will be placed
upon the rule of Watson v. Jones, there is one basic qualifi-
cation to its application. That is that the highest church
authority or tribunal, whose decision is to be accorded final
and conclusive effect, must in truth and fact be capable of
functioning freely with its activities directed by churchmen in
the interests of the church and in accordance with the organic
law of the church. In other words, where a property right
turns upon a decision of the church authority, the civil court
is under a duty, if such issue is raised, to ascertain whether
the purported authority is duly constituted and functioning.
The court is not required, without investigation and in un-
questioning obedience to a legal formula, to give conclusive
effect to the determinations of any group which purports to
exercise authority, particularly as against the contention that
the claimed authority is being subverted to secular and
irreligious ends.
This argument is couched in terms of ascertaining whether the property
of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 191 At. 140 (1937) (see note 51 supra).
With the cathedral title in the corporation, who had a "vested" interest? The
church as such? Or its members? Or neither, so that the corporation could control
its use, and the statute could be read as not affecting any vested interests?
67306 N.Y. 38, 114 N.E.2d 197 (1953).
6s Supra, page 523.
69306 N.Y. 38, 49, 114 N.E.2d 197, 203 (1953).
70 Id. at 51, 114 N.E.2d at 204.
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is being administered properly in accordance with the terms of a trust.7'
The New York court was not unanimous. In dissent it was said
that the Supreme Court did make the rule of Watson v. Jones one of
constitutional dignity, and that it meant simply this:72
. . . that, as to a subordinate body of a general church
organization the civil courts must accept, as finally binding,
the decisions of the supreme judicatory of the general organ-
ization in all matters of discipline or belief, or ecclesiastical
custom or law. Since, said the Supreme Court in its opinion
in our case, the Russian Orthodox Church is hierarchical in
government, the power to appoint, and the choice of, its arch-
bishops is a matter of ecclesiastical government, as is the right
of that appointee, as such, to occupy the cathedral. Therefore,
the question sought to be litigated in this suit was one with
which the civil courts had nothing whatever to do. Any state
interference with such choice of a prelate, or such occupancy,
would be violative of freedom of religion under the Federal
Constitution.
The split at this point is crucial, for the equivocation it created is
currently the single most important ingredient in the law of this area.
It is conjecture to argue the correctness of either position, but the
argument's resolution is decisive. If the dissent reflects more accurately
what the Supreme Court intended, a throng of cases goes by the way-
side. And there is strong support for the dissent, both in the Supreme
Court's own words7" and from the general agreement among com-
71 Courts frequently talk in terms of trust law, though in fact a gift to a
church for its general purposes does not create a technical trust. 4 Scorr ON
TRUSTS § 348.1 (2d ed. 1956). This leads to difficulties which the majority here
overlook. When the majority says that the court will look to see who of the
parties is carrying out the purposes of the trust it is assuming a jurisdiction which
is expansive if the court is willing to analyze doctrine, but which is very narrow
if it allows the highest tribunal of a church to decide the "trust purposes."
Acknowledgment and submission to church superiors is central to the theology of
hierarchical churches of the Roman Catholic and Eastern types. It is not the
privilege of the laity or inferior clergy to question the legitimacy of the highest
official, though there is a means to remove even an infallible hierarch. Should a
civil court presume, then, to litigate the legality of an occupancy even of the
highest office? The court of appeals majority clearly answers this affirmatively,
putting it in terms of trust inquiry. To the writer, this is the only proper ap-
proach, but it must be stated that it operates as a limitation on the Watson rule
as handled by the Supreme Court in the Kedroff decision. Some of the authority
cited by the New York court to support its trust rationale is not precisely on
point, because faithfulness to trust purposes was predicated on conformity to
denominational positions set by the church authorities, not by the court. E.g.,
Westminster Presbyterian Church of West Twenty Third Street v. Trustees of
Presbytery of New York, 211 N.Y. 214, 105 N.E. 199 (1914).
72 306 N.Y. at 55, 114 N.E.2d at 207.
73 "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are
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mentators74 that the court of appeals cavalierly refused to follow the
Supreme Court, circumventing its directions by an unwarranted shift
to its common law basis.
To this writer, the majority's reasoning is completely proper, and
alone acceptable. Influenced perhaps by this disposition, my next remarks
may assume too much, but the speculation merits notation.
Shortly after the second court of appeals decision, there was a
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court in a case interesting because
of its factual kinship to the Kedroff pattern. Though lawyers are told
not to ascertain a court's position from its refusal to set a case down
for argument, most will admit there is often prophetic insight in taking
notice of it. In mind is Romanian Orthodox Missionary Episcopate v.
TrutzaY These are the facts. From 1929 adherents of the Eastern
Orthodox Church were operating under the title of Romanian Ortho-
dox Missionary Episcopate of America. When the church was estab-
lished in this country it had the power to elect its own bishop, a power
delineated in by-laws adopted in 1932.6 The Holy Synod of Romania
endorsed this power by sending a bishop requested by the American
church in 1935. This bishop, named Morusca, led the American church
into adopting new by-laws providing that the selection of a bishop would
be made by the Holy Synod in Bucharest, whose Patriarch would per-
form the rite of consecration. These 1936 by-laws also read that "The
Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church is the most supreme
authority pertaining to spiritual and canonical matters of whatever
nature they may be. ... 2" As events leading to World War II gained
momentum, Morusca returned to Romania, and not until 1947 was
there again a resident bishop in this country. In that year, the Romania
government informed the American church that one Nica was being
dispatched, and that he was to be accepted. But Nica was persona non
proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a
part of the free exercise of religion against state interference." 344 U.S. 94, 116.
74E.g., "The court has taken a realistic view in a delicate situation and
justified it by a rather tenuous distinction between accepting a church authority's
decision and determining that authority's freedom to act in the church's interest.
However, the result, the judicial appointment of a church leader, violates the
basic American belief in separation of church and state and appears to be ex-
pressly forbidden by the Supreme Court's prior decision." 3 BUFFALO L. REV. 159
(1954). See also, Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 405 (1954). "By allowing impeachment
of the Patriarch's decision upon a finding that it was motivated by a subservience
to secular ends, the court has made an unwarranted exception to the Watson rule."
54 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 43S (1954).
75 120 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Ohio 1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1953),
cert den., 346 U.S. 915 (1953).
76These provided that the Romanian Orthodox Church in the United States
and Canada "forms an autonomous missionary episcopate maintaining spiritual
and canonical unity with the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church and
organic alliance with the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate." 205 F.2d at 109.
77 205 F.2d at 109.
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grata, and the American episcopate was non-receptive. Therefore, it,
like its Russian brethren of the Eastern Confession had done three
decades and three years before, sought to break fellowship.7" There
was a meeting to restore the 1932 by-law permitting home rule. To
this end a resolution was adopted, and reinstatement took effect in 1948.
Since the American episcopate continued in possession, this action in
ejectment was brought by the Romanian appointee. It was he who
claimed to represent the true church, for acts declaratory of spiritual
and organizational autonomy were acts of secession, heretical, and in-
tolerable under church discipline. Similar to Kedroff and its sur-
rounding circumstances? Indeed. And authority for the contention that
the selection of the Romanian Holy Synod-highest church judicatory-
was binding on the civil courts, was grounded in Watson v. Jones and
the Kedroff cases. But the argument got nowhere with either the
district court or the court of appeals, the latter saying:7 9
While the cited holdings state the general law upon the
subject, we do not discuss them in detail because we think
they do not govern the present controversy. In the Kedroff
case, which was announced after the instant case was decided
in the District Court, the Supreme Court held that legislation
which determines in a hierarchical church the ecclesiastical
administration or appointment of the dergy, or transfers con-
trol of churches from one group to another, interferes with
the free exercise of religion contrary to the Constitution.
Here no ordinance, statute or congressional enactment is in-
volved. This is not a case of legislation claimed to be violative
of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. It is a controversy between the American and
Canadian church group and the Communistic government in
Romania working through the hierarchy.
This eminently intelligent decision recognized the framework
within which this case arose, namely that a faithful group of believers
78It has been suggested that it was a strategic error for the American
Church to retain its recognition of the spiritual authority of the Moscow Patriarch,
28 NoTRE DAME LAW. 398 (1953). This suggestion is probably correct, especially
in view of the latest disposition of the case in the supreme court of New York.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America v.
Kreshik 9 Misc. 2d 1069, 166 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1957). That decision was on the
common law ground, and went in favor of the Russian affiliates. However, under
the broad reading of the Supreme Court's opinion, in connection with which the
above suggestion was made, the point is erroneous, for if under the opinion
property could not be carried away by those discarding an organizational hier-
archy, their impotence could not be vitalized by throwing off the spiritual authority
also. Two wrongs do not make a right. This Romanian church case is, therefore,
not distinguishable on the point that the American church withdrew recognition
of both organizational and spiritual obedience.
79 205 F.2d at 110.
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found themselves dealing not with the Holy Synod, but with a political
figure of the home church. There are undertones of an invalid consent
ab inito to the rule of the Romanian see, especially when the court
talks of the American Episcopate's "[discovery] that the controlling
and principal party to the agreement of 1935-1936 [recognizing the
authority of the Holy Synod to appoint a bishop] was totally different
from the one with which it thought it had been dealing.""0 By talking
in these terms, the possibility of a revocation of the "contract" and
return to the status quo ante was obvious, and may be read as the
rationale of the court.
Nevertheless, the court did, as the quotation above shows, specifi-
cally distinguish these facts from those in Kedroff on the absence of
any state legislative provision. And that is the important point, for if
the Supreme Court was dissatisfied with the ingenuity displayed by the
New York court in circumventing the former's Kedroff ruling, here
was an excellent opportunity to speak. Presumably the Court knew
what had transpired in Albany, for the court of appeals had displayed
its deftness in July of 1953, almost a half year before the Supreme
Court turned down a hearing of the Trutza case."1
Not surprisingly the court made a comment on religious freedom
and the protection given it by the Kedroff decision. A very interesting
comment, too, for it is essentially a quotation from the Kedroff decision
which, when transported into the context of this case, gives a considera-
bly changed emphasis to the point made. The court remarked:82
We also think that this conclusion is in accord with the spirit,
if not with the letter, of the Kedroff case, which declares
that freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods
of choice are proven . . . must now be said to have federal
constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of re-
ligion against the interference of an individual American
state, we think it should be equally true as to protection
against the domination and interference of a foreign state.
Notice the words "no improper methods." What are their impli-
cations? At least if there is evidence of a foreign state interference,
"freedom of religion" here appears directed at the freedom of the
communion of members to choose their clergy, and not the freedom
of the church qua church to make the choice, an exceedingly different
variation on the same theme. This emphasis did not appear in the
Kedroff decision, principally because the unconstitutionality of a statute
was involved, but also due to the imprecision of the Court's remarks
addressed to the obligation of a civil court to follow the decree of a
80 205 F.2d at 112.
81 The denial of certiorari, 346 U.S. 915, was on December 14, 1953. The
second court of appeals ruling from New York, circumventing the Supreme Court
decision, came down on July 14, 1953, 306 N.Y. 38, 114- N.E.2d 197.
82 205 F.2d at 112.
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church judicatory. What else may fail to meet the test of a proper
method is for speculation, with adherence to proper procedure coming
instantly to mind. The point is, there is a loophole here which can
permit a civil court to avoid being a mere rubber stamp when exigencies
so merit.
Again, though emphasizing that denial of certiorari is all that there
is to go on, it may be that the scope of the Kedroff decision in the
Supreme Court is more aligned with what the New York Court of
Appeals said it was than with the contextual implications of its own
words.
VIII
From the preceding, it is clear that any thinking that the Kedroff
decision overthrew an extended history of cases in American courts
should not too soon be crystallized. My own judgment is that the
handling of church dispute cases in the courts has been affected very
little. True, the Court's decision does appear to paralyze remedies
through the legislature; but that is not where relief is sought anyway.
It is to courts that these squabbles come for resolution, and by and large
American courts have handled them very successfully and intelligently.
To understand judicial treatment of these cases, searching must
penetrate considerably beyond the monotonously reiterated statements
that courts will not hear purely religious issues, or that a state may not
extend preferential or even nondiscriminatory aid, or that a given fact
violates the precept of religious freedom. These high level abstractions
are at best inept guides for setting the standard of conduct an organ of
government may or may not pursue. This is not to say that nothing of
value springs from their use. Surely it is true that they characterize a
point of departure, a framework within which to operate, which is
considerably more comfortable than jumping off from a premise pre-
scribing an affirmative governmental duty to aid religion. In the final
analysis, government even in this country traditionally has, as it must,
rendered some services. Incorporation statutes for religious societies are
excellent examples, and it would be stretching a principle to rediculous
limits to declare them unconstitutional.8 3
Whatever may be said of the platitudinous language of the courts,
one thing is certain. Through the decades, there has been a slow but
certain trend for courts more and more to rely on the decision of the
proper church judicatory. The disposition of a civil court merely to
formalize a church tribunal's decision is greater or less depending upon
the context out of which the dispute arises. The presence of a property
interest is not by any means the sure guide it is said to be.
83 Only under the constitutions of Virginia and West Virginia, are the
legislatures not permitted to grant a charter of incorporation to a religious body.
VA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 59. W.VA. CONST. art. VI, § 47.
[Vol. 20
RELIGIOUS ISSUES
It is fitting and proper for civil courts to be reluctant to adjudicate
controversies of a religious nature, and the propriety of this disposition
increases if the given fact pattern does not involve a property interest.
American law knows no theological orthodoxy, and it is beyond the
competence of a court to determine the verity of any religious dogma.
Among the myriad of church cases, a relatively small proportion appear
from their facts not to involve property rights, or at least alleged
property rights. One such area is, for example, the pretension on the
part of a member that it has a right to determine when church sacra-
ments ought to be administered to it. The courts have not had too many
opportunities to speak on this precise point, but where the cases have
arisen, they are dear that the administration of church sacraments is a
prerogative of the proper cleric to decide; it is his authority to give or
withhold. The clearest and most outstanding case to this effect came
from Massachusetts. 4 The court was explicit in denying relief, even
stating that the priest's denunciation of the member as a public sinner,
so long as made in the privacy of church business, was not actionable.
Contractual consent was the basis of the Massachusetts court's
decision. However there are difficulties in talking in terms of contract.
Membership in a church often comes by baptism, at which time a
person if it is infant baptism ought not in civil courts to be talked of as
having contracted. Even the renewal of the baptismal vow at confir-
mation is at a time in most persons lives when they are not in their
majority, not legally capable of contracting. This is a minor objection,
unless the basis of a decision is solely contractual. Sufficient as a reason
should be the nature of a voluntary religious association, for it must be
the function of the appointed clergy to determine the right to church
sacraments. They are the primary property of the Christian Church,
as are the religious rites of any faith. Policy considerations would direct
that the proper church clerics or officials decide their use, for it is
patently arguable that if the spiritual accouterments of participating
in a church sacrament or other spiritual rights of membership are of
such interest to the complainant member, its remedy is the sequence of
contrition and remission, not the civil courts.
Frequent cases of membership also appear. As an isolated issue,
this, too, should be solely in the dominion of proper church officials.
Voluntary association presumably means voluntary, and not coerced
membership. There is a pervasive legal concept that another has no
legal right to membership in a private group, and this concept, what-
ever may be said of its deterioration in other areas, is zealously re-
spected in religious society cases. Here again, arguments in terms of
contracting to accept the rules of the society are subject to the objection
that the incoming member does not think seriously, if at all, along these
84 Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, 111 N.E. 358 (1916).
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lines.8 r It is an unnecessary if not in some instances improper application
of contractual concepts. Absent any property interest, the properly exe-
cuted action of the church body should be final,86 and that is generally
the attitude of American courts.
Notice the use of the adverb "properly" in the preceding sentence.
This raises the question, should the civil court concern itself with the
procedural integrity of an expulsion? Courts have answered this both
ways. Curiously, here would appear to be a more appropriate place for
the application of contract principles, and yet many courts which refuse
jurisdiction to give relief, because of the consent a member is said to
have given in joining a religious society, fail to take the next step of
enforcing the rights received to make his consent binding. 7 The least
that might be demanded is that religious societies adhere to their pre-
scribed methods for effectuating an expulsion. However, the standards
frequently lack precision, and in the context of such a pattern courts
have enforced their notions of due process without achieving desirable
results. An enthymeme of these cases is that the court conceives
85 Hendryx v. People's United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 84 Pac. 1123 (1906),
in which the court remarked, in the context of a case protecting expelled members,
that persons joining a church should not be held too closely to a knowledge of its
arbitrary rules of procedure in expulsion and other matters. It makes sense how-
ever, to speak in contract terms when referring to ministers or priests. "The
minister, in legal point of view, is a voluntary member of the association to which
he belongs. The position is not forced upon him, he seeks it. He accepts it, with
all its burdens and consequences; with all the rules and laws, and canons then
subsisting, or to be made by competent authority; and can, at pleasure and with
impunity, abandon it." Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509, 533-34 (1871).86 The following have been held not to be property interests: Membership,
Mt. Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 So. 2d 617 (1949)
(a person no matter how dissatisfied cannot invoke the supervisory power of a
civil court so long as no civil right is involved, membership not being such);
Waller v. Howell, 20 Misc. 236, 45 N.Y.Supp. 790 (1897); cf. Galton v. Nesson,
201 Mass. 534, 88 N.E. 2 (1909) (membership in the corporation is a civil right
because representing ownership). Support and salary, State v. Holy Roman
Apostolic Catholic Church, 183 Mo. App. 190, 170 S.W. 396 (1914); Baxter v.
McDonnell, 155 N.Y. 83, 49 N.E. 667 (1898); contra, Kaminski v. Hoynak, 373
Pa. 194, 95 A.2d 548 (1953). Right to continue as priest or pastor, Coleman v.
Swanson, 293 Ill. App. 622, 11 N.E.2d 840 (1938); King v. Smith, 106 Kan. 624,
189 Pac. 147 (1920); Bonacum v. Murphy, 71 Neb. 463, 104 N.W. 180 (1905)
(court will not look into regularity of proceedings dismissing Roman Catholic
bishop) ; contra, Slaughter v. Dempsey, 71 Cal. App. 396, 162 P.2d 843 (1945)
(contract term of three months notice enforceable) ; cf., Free Will Baptist Church
v. Franklin, 148 Fla. 277, 4 So. 2d 390 (1941) (court will act only in case of a
showing of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" of ecclesiastical decision). Burial
rights, McQuire v. St. Patrick's Cathedral, 54 Hun. 207, 7 N.Y.Supp. 345 (1889).
87 This inconsistency may also be found in a single opinion. A court may
talk in terms of submission to ecclesiastical jurisdiction of a church as a condition
of membership, and at the same time ignore what those conditions may have been
when the membership was assumed. Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d
368 (1950).
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membership per se a civil right within the protection of the courts, 88
that for jurisdiction to be exercised a property right need not first be
established.
To illustrate, a recent case8" from Ohio presented the following
fact pattern. The constitution of the congregation provided that mem-
bers could be expelled for "gross sin and failure to repent thereof" and
that a "fair and impartial investigation and trial" would first be had
"according to Matthew 18:15-17." This is the Biblical exhortation that
"if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault be-
tween thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee thou has gained thy
brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two
more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be
established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the
Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as
a heathen man and a publican." On several occasions the pastor and
deacons of the church called on the complainant, and upon her repeated
refusal to renew church attendance, she was dismissed. The exegetical
insight of the court must have been rare, for it deemed itself competent
to say that the visits of pastor and deacon, together with their formal
expulsion at a properly constituted meeting were not in compliance with
this Biblically oriented constitutional prescription of the congregation.
The court spoke of the discharge as being arbitrary. But was it?
A good deal of effort failed to get the expelled interested in church
affairs and worship, and on her reticence, indeed her sheer refusal, the
hand of fellowship was withdrawn. There was no evidence of a con-
niving to get rid of the plaintiff's membership, and what the church
officials did seemed quite consonant with its constitutional directive. By
notice and opportunity for a hearing the court seemed to mean but one
88 See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 993 (1930). Professor Chafee wrote that "excommunication from a church
means loss of the opportunity to worship God in familiar surroundings with a
cherished ritual, and inflicts upon the devout believer loneliness of spirit and
perhaps the dread of eternal damnation. In comparison with such emotional
deprivations, mere losses of property often appear trivial. It would seem natural
that courts of equity should consider the desirability of remedying such injuries
to personalities. . . ." Id. at 998. Conceding that there are occasions where ex-
pulsions appeared to have been unjust (e.g., Moss Point Baptist Church v. Dees,
17 So. 1 (Miss. 1895)). Expelled member had donated most of the labor and
money to construct the church, and was then dismissed by nine of fifty members
under a preconceived plan.), the instances are rare, and usually contain facts
sufficient for redress on independent grounds. Professor Chafee's argument ignores
the avenue of contrition and repentence-doctrines not to be ignored when dealing
with Christian communions-which is open to the "devout believer" with the
"dread of eternal damnation," whose emotional disturbances referred to in the
quotation are more likely a phantom than reality. The argument has considerably
more appeal in the instances of labor unions, because of their enormous influence
over the well-being of their members.
S9 Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 53 Ohio Op. 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954).
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thing, a formalized trial and opportunity for cross examination. But it
is not the function of civil courts to tell church societies what procedures
are necessary for dismissal from the spiritual bond of the communion
of the faithful.9"
Segregation of a claim for reinstatement or for sacramental par-
ticipation from an alleged property right is rare. Nearly all church dis-
putes involve the claim that property rights are being interfered with.
That judicial standing to assert a property claim is no formidable
problem is explicable in view of the class action theory and its codifi-
cation in most states."' Consequently, the norm that courts will not
decide purely religious issues is one which appears infrequently as the
single ratiocination. How, then, is the bulk handled?
Recall that the Watson v. Jones decision spoke of three general
classifications of property cases coming from ecclesiastical bodies. The
first two distinguished between those where property was held under
an instrument deeding it to the propagation of some specific form of
religious doctrine or belief and those holding property as an independent
congregation. That distinction is considerably clearer than it is useful,
for two reasons. First, a huge category of congregations will fall into
the hierarchical classification by virtue of their subordinate position to a
larger ecclesiastical body, so that if a deed read that property were given
in trust for the teaching of a stated religious belief, which belief is that
of a religious denomination, subsequent conflicts over the use of the
property might possibly be settled by the denominational hierarchy and
not by a civil tribunal's application of a property or trust concept.
Secondly, property of an ecclesiastical group is most frequently held for
a designated congregation, specific doctrines not being denominated,
except insofar as may be inferred from the congregational name. It
then redounds upon the court to categorize the case.9" This is a signifi-
90 The opposite judicial attitude, and probably that more often repeated, was
expressed in Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368 (1950). In an action
for a declaratory judgment on who were rightful members, the court said, "All
questions relating to the faith and practice of the church and of its members
belong to the church judicatories, to which the members have voluntarily subjected
themselves, since, when a person becomes a member of a church, he does so upon
the condition of submission to its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and however much he
may be dissatisfied with the exercise of that jurisdiction, he has no right to invoke
the supervisory power of a civil court so long as none of his civil rights are
involved." Id. at 855, 59 S.E.2d at 370. To the same effect are, Evans v. Shiloh
Baptist Church, 196 Md. 543, 77 A.2d 160 (1950) (court, in sustaining demurrer
to plaintiff's suit to be reinstated to full membership, said that even irregularity
of proceedings would not justify equitable intervention); White v. Mt. Beulah
Baptist Church, 319 Mich. 392, 29 N.W.2d 774 (1947). See also Velasco v.
Protestant Episcopal Church, 200 Md. 634, 92 A.2d 373 (1952).
9 1
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-13 (1950).
92The nature of the property may aid the classification. A church building
is used principally by local worshippers, whereas a college plant is used by
members of an entire denomination. Therefore, though the same denomination is
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cant step, for it sets the pattern of the rationale to follow, a rationale
which may on the one hand be directed at the conflicting religious
positions of the contestants or on the other hand be influenced more by
the continuity of the given congregational body.
A few cases will demonstrate the point and also indicate some of
the difficulties incumbent in either approach.
A Missouri court93 a decade ago had to resolve a conflict over who
would serve as pastor of an unincorporated congregation "affiliated"
with a loose group of churches called the Free Will Baptist Church.
The plaintiffs had judicial standing as successors to those originally
holding title as trustees. Their suit was to enjoin the defendants, who
represented the majority of the congregation, from expelling them as
members and from interfering with their right to use the property.
First, the court stated that an unincorporated religious body could not
hold title to land, but that it must be held by trustees for the society.
But such was a bare legal title, carrying with it no rights to complete
custody and control, empowering only those acts necessary for the trust
purpose of holding for the church. Who decided church purposes?
Since it had been customary for the congregation, though totally autono-
mous and independent of any larger organized church body, to follow
the rules of the Treatise of Faith and Practice of the Free Will Asso-
ciation, the court sought an answer in that document, which read that
"Fellowship, expulsion, and all other items of business of the church
shall be settled by a vote of the majority present." In view of this, it
was for the congregation to determine the use of the property, and
therefore that part of a lower court injunction against the defendant's
interference with the use of the plaintiff was reversed. Membership
remained as the sole issue, and since the court had in earlier decisions
determined that to be a matter purely ecclesiastical the congregation's
majority vote was final. The injunction against interference with
membership rights fell because that issue stood alone, leaving the plain-
tiffs without remedy.
If the objection is raised that this permits the majority to change
the purposes of the trust, the objection is not acceptable. To begin with,
is it not arguable that one purpose of a trust to a congregationally
organized church is that the congregation may decide the use of its
involved, a court may in the latter case follow the decision of a denominational
tribunal, but in the former decline to follow it. This distinction was neatly made
in two Missouri cases, one involving a local Presbyterian congregation near
St. Louis, Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873), and the other a Presbyterian
affiliated college in St. Louis, Watson v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183 (1869). The cases
came out of the same dispute as did Watson v. Jones, and there is no doubt that
political implications played a role. For a full treatment of Missouri church cases,
see Losos, Courts and the Churches in Missouri, 1956 WAsH. U. L. Q. 67 (1956).
93 Murr v. Maxwell, 232 S.V.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1950). Cf. Longmeyer v.
Paine, 205 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1947).
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property? Further, even the sweeping approach of the Murr decision
has limitations. But first among its merits is that it keeps courts out of
the business of private societies which are religious. Functionally, it
preserved the continuity of the congregation, investing the use of its
property in the majority of its members, and avoiding the raft of com-
plexities and imponderables of going into the matter of doctrinal
analysis. True, the court stated that no doctrinal matters were in dis-
pute. But are not issues of who shall serve as pastor and matters of
internal church government doctrinal considerations? Many churches
think so. What the court really did was to circumvent that problem by
following the decision of the highest tribunal, which for an inde-
pendent church was the majority vote of the congregation.
When courts talk about changes in doctrine in order to find an
inpingement of a trust, amazing words proceed from the lips of men
trained in the law and not in things ecclesiastic. Ragsdall v. Church
of Christ in Eldora,4 was the customary suit by ousted members to
establish a trust in ecclesiastical property allegedly diverted to a faith
different from that adhered to by all parties prior to the development
of the rift. The defendants were the pastor and officers of the church.
Articles of incorporation had been amended to allow for the adoption
of by-laws, setting up an expulsion procedure which was used to strip
the plaintiffs of their membership. Any member, the by-law read, could
be dropped for delinquent church attendance, or for any other cause
deemed sufficient by a concurring vote of two-thirds of the members
after a full hearing held upon ten days written notice. "As far as all
spiritual and religious matters are concerned," the church articles pro-
vided that "the membership shall follow the general leadership of the
Church of Christ, but as far as property and property rights are con-
cerned, this organization shall be free and independent of every other
organization."9
5
At the time the changes were instituted a schism between the
plaintiffs and the defendant pastor was already forming. It climaxed
when the pastor succeeded in convincing a majority to "cooperate"
with a different church body. Choice of cooperation ran either to the
Church of Christ or the Christian Church, both Campbellite groups
which according to some of the testimony had exchange of pulpit
fellowship. The thrust of the plaintiff's complaint was that cooperation
was moving in the wrong direction. The court did not agree, seeing no
legal distinction between the two. To take this de minimus position is
sometimes both necessary and good."6 But it is pregnant with danger;
94 244 Ia. 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1952).
9 5 1d. at 479-80, 55 N.W.2d at 542.
96 Two cases, involving the same doctrinal dispute, illustrate the point. One
was disposed of by reference to the contractual terms of the pastor's office.
Blauert v. Schupmann, 241 Minn. 447, 63 N.W.2d 578 (1954). The other, deprived
of this analysis and without a higher church organ to look to for a decision, had
[Vol. 20
1959] RELIGIOUS ISSUES
and this case is a stellar example, for in meeting the plaintiff's challenge
that the new affiliation constituted a change in denomination, therefore
proscribed even as against an independently organized rbligious society,
the court argued that the newly embraced denomination must be
"fundamentally" different in doctrine. This is a generally accepted
principle, which, when applied here, the court said, would not vitiate the
conduct of the defendants. What was the context of this application?
One of the alleged doctrinal departures was that the defendants had
added a "fundamental" tenet in providing for "No Creed but Christ."
Somehow this was hooked up with belief in the virgin birth of Christ,
on which the court had this to remark:97
But is this doctrine of the Virgin Birth so fundamentally
different from belief "in the Fatherhood of God," "that Jesus
is the Son of God and the Savior," and "that the Bible is the
Word of God"? Is it basically a violation of the dictum or
tenet "no Creed but Christ, no rule of faith and conduct but
the Bible"? There may be some theological distinction but
there is none to the ordinary lay person. To most people
trinitarian belief imputes divine origin to Jesus, stemming
from the New Testament account of his birth.
Theologians would shudder at such patent misinformation. The
dogma of the virgin birth may be deemed as solid as any pillar in the
framework of Christian theology, an essential ingredient in the philo-
sophical construct supporting the divinity of Jesus Christ, and a prin-
cipal article of the creeds of the Church.9" And what court may say
otherwise? The words of the court are amazing both for their lack of
information and for their suggestion that an alleged similar intellectual
deficiency on the part of the run-of-the-mill members of a church
should set the standards of the church's doctrine. When a court brings
attitudes concerning the virgin birth within the orbit of "nice distinctions
to meet squarely the doctrinal charge. The court compared the words and
grammar of the opposing statements, and, finding no real distinction, granted
relief to the majority which had approved the revised wording of the doctrines.
Mertz v. Schaeffer, 271 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1954). Unlike the Ragsdall situ-
ation, the Mertz facts did concern theological hair-splitting, in which event it is
well to refrain from finding a doctrinal change, thus permitting the majority to
continue in possession of church properties.
97244 Ia. at 485, 55 N.W.2d at 545.
98 Having made this New Testament reference on the dogma of the virgin
birth, the court might have exercised care to search the Biblical pages. Matthew
1: 23, reads: "Behold, a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son,
and they shall call his name Emanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us."
The Old Testament prohecy reads in Isaiah 7: 14, "Therefore the Lord himself
shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin [young woman, (Revised Standard)]
shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel." The chief
creeds-Apostles' and Nicene--of the Christian Church both include the virginal
reference.
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or shades of opinion on doctrinal points or practice" not meriting the
"interference of a court of equity," which may be had "only when the
departure from the faith is so substantial as to amount to a diversion of
the property from the -trust purpose," 99 the danger of following the
doctrinal analysis in settling church disputes becomes distressingly obvi-
ous. While the case may be an extreme example,1"' the illustration
serves to underscore the merit of an organizational orientation rather
than a doctrinal quest in settling church disputes. For if courts are to
be insensitive to theological hairsplitting, as this court thought this con-
flict to be, it were better to be so not by judging doctrine, but by erecting
more functional solutions, like that of the Murr decision.
The impropriety of the Ragsdall decision is marked not only by
its stunning indifference to doctrinal distinctions, but also by the fact
that, aside from the majority rule solution, an innocuous hook on which
to hang the decision was available. Adoption of the revised articles of
incorporation took place after a filing was made with the proper state
official-a flaw in the sequence commanded by statute. Where such an
"out" is available to a court, it ought to be and frequently is invoked.1 "
It is a fact of these disputes, that unless the deed conveying property
sets forth certain doctrines to be propagated through the use of the
gift ° it is relatively rare where a court absolutely must get involved
with doctrine.
On its surface, the decisional pattern that a majority may not
change the denominational affiliation of a church society, or may not
fundamentally change its doctrine, seems not only proper but utilitarian.
And it is true that the rule has some usefulness. The simplest pattern
for application of the norm would be that a majority may not vote a
Baptist church into unity with Presbyterians, or Methodists, or Lutherans,
or Roman Catholics, and so on.1"3 But so simple a picture is not the type
99 244 Ia. at 485, 55 N.W.2d at 545.
100 Cf. Marr v. Galbraith, 238 Mo. App. 497, 184 S.W.2d 190 (1944), and
Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909).
101 E.g., Bomar v. Mt. Olive Missionary Baptist Church, 92 Cal. App. 618,
268 Pac. 665 (1928). Control of the congregation was acquired by a minority
through incorporation, achieved by falsely representing to the secretary of state
that required formalities were complied with. The court ordered a reconveyance
of the property to the plaintiffs as trustees of the unincorporated church. "The
bald question here is, Can a man or set of men, or a majority of the church
organization, by chicanery, deceit and fraud, divert the property of a church
organization to a purpose entirely foreign to the purposes of the organization,
for their own selfish benefit, whether by the expulsion of members or in any other
fraudulent manner? Neither the law nor public policy will sustain such a rule."
Id. at 626, 268 Pac. at 668, quoting from Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W.
874 (1892). See also, Kubilius v. Hawes Unitarian Congregational Church, 322
Mass. 638, 79 N.E.2d 5 (1948) ; West Koshkonong Congregation v. Otteson, 80
Wis. 62, 49 N.W. 24 (1891).
102E.g., Chatfield v. Dennington, 206 Ga. 762, 58 S.E.2d 842 (1950).
103 Cf. Harmon v. Dreher, 1 Speers Eq. 87 (S.C.) (1843).
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giving courts their work. As in Ragsdall, there is usually an attempt to
affiliate with groups whose distinctions are considerably more subtle.
Even if a court does not go astray to the extent that the Ragsdall
court did, comparison of the cases points up that with judicial restraint
a desirable state of the law is not necessarily forthcoming.
Two cases typify the weakness, essentially one of predictibility.
Reid v. Johnston' was a 1954 decision where the court reiterated that
a majority could not change the denominational affiliation of a church.
The North Rocky Mount Missionary Church was a congregationally
organized society affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention. The
pastor became dissatisfied with certain developments in the convention,
including their adoption of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible.
After ill feelings ripened, a vote approved the pastor's urgings to have
the congregation withdraw. Secession accomplished, all support of
numerous convention programs terminated. No attempt was made to
affiliate with a new church group. Rather, a resolution was adopted
that the body remain independent, whereupon was initiated this action
to restrain the defendants from interfering with use of the property.
Searching for a possible doctrinal transposition, the court said that
simply withdrawing from the convention might not have been a breach
of trust purposes, but when coupled with the cessation of long rendered
support of missionary and other programs, and especially the resolution
to remain independent, it constituted a fundamental change of doctrine,
usage, and custom. The majority by voting this course had by their
conduct ceased being members10 5 of the church, and control of the
property was vested in the plaintiffs.
On the surface, the decision seems sound. There is the anomalous
suggestion that had the congregation upon withdrawing from the con-
vention not resolved to remain independent, but had voted to affiliate
with another convention, perhaps one not adopting the Revised Standard
Version, 0 6 the result would have been different. Something akin to this
occurred in Kempf v. Lentz, °7 an Ohio ruling of eleven years earlier.
There the chief cause of dissention was withdrawing support from
college and seminaries sponsored by the Ohio District Convention of
Brethren Churches. Rather than stopping support altogether, the con-
104 241 N.C. 201, 85 S.E.2d 114 (1954).
105 Cf. West Koshkonong Congregation v. Otteson, SO Wis. 62, 49 N.W. 24
(1891), where the court said there could be dismemberment only in one of two
ways, voluntary withdrawal or expulsion, and as long as disputants both claim to
be the true members, there is no voluntary withdrawal, and if there has not been
an effective expulsion, both remain as members.
10 6This court apparently considered the adoption of the Revised Standard
Version to be a contributing element in a fundamental doctrinal shift. Is it not
fair, in view of their similarity and of the interpretive variances surrounding a
single version, to inquire of the court's competence to make this judgment?
107 68 N.E.2d 339 (1943).
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gregation shifted its efforts to another Brethren seminary, but as a result
incurred the disapproval of the Ohio Convention, which denied it affili-
ation. The independently organized congregation was therefore un-
connected, but was channeling support to different territories. Yet the
court did not rule that the majority had withdrawn itself from member-
ship, because the changes were not regarded as fundamental. The result
was good; but not the reasoning, it being difficult to reconcile with the
equally vulnerable application of the same rule. Factually, the two cases
were essentially indistinguishable,' and yet productive of opposing re-
sults. Utilization of the majority rule formula' 9 would have served
well the desire for predictibility, though under it the Reid results would
have changed. That, too, may have been for better, leaving the pleasures
of possession to the majority as fewer heads cooled while the congre-
gation patched up its unsightly differences.
By emphasizing the majority control or doctrinal analysis tests as
solutions to church disputes, there is no intention to convey the impression
that these are the only remedies. They are the most frequent. A decree
could be issued, however, to force the sale of church property," 0 and
distribute the proceeds according to a court approved plan. But the
market for church property is not large, and most edifices can be sold
for only a fraction of either their replacement or functional value.
Consequently, this remedy is very fortunately, sparingly used by the
courts.
11
108 The suggestion that in Lentz the independent status was involuntary be-
cause of denial of affiliation by the higher authorities on analysis fades as a
distinction, for the act which brought denial was voluntary.
109Douglas v. First Baptist Church of Ft. Collins, 132 Colo. 286, 287 P.2d
965 (1955); Wright v. Smith, 4 Ill. App. 470, 124 N.E.2d 363 (1955) (in this case
the court said, without discussing the point, that disaffiliation and termination of
missionary activity in itself did not constitute a fundamental change of doctrine.
The case involved a Disciples of Christ congregation.)
110 Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ill. 25 (1863) (most members of a Presby-
terian congregation were Portuguese, and had been baptized Roman Catholic.
The presbytery ruled against the validity of the Roman baptism, but withheld
disciplinary orders since the congregation had been organized prior to attachment
to the presbytery. The pastor refused rebaptism, and by a vote of 105 to 101 led
withdrawal from the presbytery, though continuing in Presbyterian teachings.
The court held that by withdrawing the majority did not lose their membership,
and in view of the near even split, ordered the property sold. See also Niccolls v.
Rugg, 47 Ill. 47 (1868). Some congregations are organized with an agreement
that in case of dispute the property will be sold and the proceeds distributed
according to a prearranged formula. See, e.g., Canadian Religious Association
of North Brookfield v. Parmenter, 180 Mass. 415, 62 N.E. 740 (1902).
111This attitude is expressed in German Ev. Lutheran Trinity Congregation
v. Deutsche Ev. Lutherische Dreieinigkeits Gemeinde, 246 Il1. 328, 92 N.E. 868
(1910). Even though independently organized, if feuding factions appoint a third
party or council to determine which of them is faithful to the doctrines of the
church, the decision of the mediator, though in favor of the minority, ought to be
followed. The court thus avoids discussing doctrine, and compels compliance with
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Churches prelatically or centrally organized are not immune
from internal conflagrations any more than are their independently
structured brethren. But they possess built-in machinery for the dis-
position of their internal difficulties, and the use of and decisions by these
organs are not ignored in the civil courts. Adhesion to the decrees of
a church's highest tribunal is strongly favored, a natural development in
descent from Watson v. Jones. Frequently it is repeated that the deter-
mination of the highest church judicature, even where property rights
are involved, is conclusive upon the civil courts. But this is so, "not
because the law recognizes any authority in such bodies to make any
decision touching civil rights, but because the parties, by their contract,
have made the right of property to depend on adherence to, or teaching
of, the particular doctrines as they may be defined by such judicatory. 1 1 2
Earlier on these pages comment was made on the propriety of
using contract principles. Now it is necessary only to recognize the
consequences of applying the rule that the highest church body controls.
A recent case" 3 reflects well the current judicial response to in-
ternal disputes in centrally organized churches. St. Paul's Methodist
Church of Defiance, Ohio, was a member of the Ohio Conference of
the Methodist Church. Its articles of incorporation provided that the
congregation would be subject to the Discipline, usage and ministerial
appointments of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States,
but that secular affairs of the church would be managed and controlled
by a board of trustees elected and organized according to the provisions
of the Discipline. With this was the superficially conflicting reservation
that the local congregation had power to sell, hold, or purchase property.
That was an issue presented when the Methodist bishop, believing the
congregation in need of a change of pastor, made an appointment not
acceptable to the congregation. The board of trustees refused to relin-
quish possession of the parsonage to the new appointee, and withheld
salary payments pending settlement of the dispute. To reach a con-
clusion, the court noted first, that the provision of the Methodist Dis-
cipline concerning the appointment of a pastor were properly followed;
second, that the congregation was part of the Methodist Conference
under the articles of incorporation, and therefore the properly exercised
authority of church discipline controlled." 4  It was a mere matter of
the decision of a council consented to by both factions. See Mt. Zion Baptist
Church v. Whitinore, S3 Ia. 138, 49 N.W. 81 (1891).
112 East Norway Lake Norwegian Ev. Lutheran Church v. Halvorson, 42
Minn. 503, 44 N.W. 663, 665 (1890).
113 Ohio Annual Conference v. Richards, 130 N.E.2d 736 (1954).
114 The court talked of two types of churches, congregational and con-
nectional, the latter being subject to higher church authorities. Most courts will
speak of three classifications (independent, presbyterian, and hierarchical) though
at least one case refers to a fourth, papal. Elston v. Wilborn. 208 Ark. 277, VU;
SAV.2d 662 (1945).
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formalizing the properly constituted decisions of the church.
Little in the case alluded to the empty distinction between religious
and property disputes. The court might have said that it would not rule
on the pastorate occupancy, regarding that as purely ecclesiastical. In-
stead it ascertained the subordinate status of the congregation, examined
the higher church tribunal's action to ascertain its regularity, and ruled
accordingly-on both the pastoral occupancy and the control of church
property. No trust rationale, no doctrinal analysis with its many weak-
nesses. Rather, a solid, functional disposition of the case, barely ex-
tending a deferential curtsy to the time-worn distinction between purely
religious issues and those involving property.
The logic of the preceding case has extensions which lead to the
conclusion that a church tribunal can change the doctrines of the church,
and take with it the property of its congregations. It is not unknown
among church bodies that sometimes enormous doctrinal modifications
are made. By applying the rule of the highest church tribunal, the
courts open themselves to the analysis that their interest lies principally
with organizational continuity rather than doctrinal. Though there are
cases which seem to make no exceptions,"' it is safe to say that limi-
tations similar to those imposed on congregationally organized churches
are equally valid here." 6
A fair measure of predictibility prevails under the preceding rea-
soning, subject only to the fact that what is a centrally organized
church is itself an unsettled issue. Neither decisions of civil tribunals nor
church documents, as constitutions, by-laws, and the like, are a certain
guide. That a larger church body has rules by which local congre-
gations become attached to it would tend to show that the church is
centrally organized; and yet this very provision may be the pitfall to the
central organization's claim against the alleged misuse of a local congre-
gation's property. For if there has not been full or substantial com-
pliance with the rules of admission, it may be ruled that the local
congregation has maintained its independent status, despite close affili-
ation with the central church body." 7  Such a disposition is hard to
115 First Protestant Reformed Church of Grand Rapids v. De Wolfe, 344
Mich. 624, 75 N.W.2d 19 (1956) (court pro forma applied the decision of the
higher church body which had ruled a local pastor and his constituents heretical,
though they in turn had alleged the same of the higher body.)
116,"Nor will we ourselves assume to override an ecclesiastical judicatory
unless a departure from accepted faith and teaching threatening to divert property
to a purpose radically different from that for which it was acquired is plain and
unmistakable, for it is not to be supposed that judges of the civil courts can be as
competent to interpret the religious doctrines of every denomination as are the
ablest men in each in respect to their own." Church of God v. Church of God,
355 Pa. 478, 486, 50 A.2d 357, 361 (1947).
117African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jenkins, 139 Conn. 418, 94 A.2d
618 (1953) (the polity of the national body was episcopal. The local congregation
had not gone through all formalities prescribed for attachment, but had cooperated
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square with a decision which holds that on account of a congregation's
name it has become denominationally integrated."' But the confusion
in the courts is no more annoying than the failure of churches to take
into account, when drafting their governmental regulations, the avail-
ability of an increasingly more accepted principle which allows churches
to decide how their internal differences will be settled. Churches, how-
ever structured and at all levels, need to exert appreciably more effort
to avoid the pitfalls which lead to litigation. The starting place is in
their own polity,"19 after which attention should be turned to advising
benefactors on the form of their conveyances.1
20
Ix
If the concern of civil church law is to protect the maximum
degree of free action by individuals, then it can be said that the common
law decisional pattern has developed well. Vatson v. Jones commenced
the demise of compulsory democratic management of church tempo-
ralities, and gave strength to those cases which had argued for enforcing
the decrees of higher church authorities to which members had volun-
tarily submitted. Nothing is necessarily abhorrent about the shift, for
free men to the extent that they are not able voluntarily to organize and
delegate to another the management of their organization's property
closely with the national body, even to the point of accepting its pastor by the
latter's appointment. The court nevertheless ruled the local church independent.)
118 Michigan Congregational Conference v. United Church of Stanton, 330
Mich. 561, 48 NAV.2d 108 (1951).
119 A survey of church constitutions and by-laws, for both local congregations
and national bodies, of most American church bodies revealed many areas of
potential conflict, too numerous for listing here. A typical example is the Methodist
Conference case, supra note 113.
120 In Church of God of Decatur v. Finney, 344 Ill. App. 598, 101 N.E.2d
856 (1951), there was a conveyance of property to the local congregation for its
use "so long as the church maintained doctrinal unity with the General Ministerial
Assembly." This assembly was purely voluntary, and by its regulations had no
authority over local congregations. The defendant pastor had been a member of
the assembly, but was expelled, and suit was brought against him and his sup-
porters to enjoin them from interfering with the plaintiff's use of church property.
The court held for the plaintiff, but not, as it might have done, on the basis of
the wording of the deed, but because it deemed that the close cooperation which
it had enjoyed with the assembly made it subject thereto, and the majority could
not vote or amend church by-laws to permit eradication of this association.
Cf. African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jenkins, supra note 117, and Ginossi
v. Samatos, 3 Ill. App. 2d 514, 123 N.E.2d 104 (1954) (local constitution provided
that referral to higher church body should be made on certain contingencies, and
the local congregation received its priest through appointment of the higher
authority, and yet the court held the local church had not become subject to the
higher body. The case involved political undertones of trying to cast off a
communist Albanian appointed bishop in favor of an appointee of the Patriarch
of Constantinople.)
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are not free. The discussion of the preceding pages has indicated to
what extent the courts go in enforcing the orders of higher church
bodies, when it is found that to them others have submitted. The dis-
cussion herein has also meant to punctuate the poorer disposition of cases
emerging from independently organized religious societies.
The foremost blemish in this decisional evolution are the words
(broadly interpreted) of the Supreme Court in the Kedroff decision.
That case is, in the judgment of this writer, neither good precedent nor
intelligent in result. It is not the latter for it failed to account for the
kindling causes of the dissension. While preventing, under the guise of
separation of church and state, self expression of the American church
group, 2' it permitted a wholesale interference with their religious
activities by the government of another country, let alone that of a
government dangerously hostile to our interests.22 Poor conclusions have
before resulted from imperceptive applications of words which make
attractive sounding principles.
Nor is the Court's reasoning good precedent, especially if one
proceeds from the premise that if liberty is to mean anything, it must
refer to individuals, not to institutions qua institutions--state, church,
labor, or otherwise. It is not even an extension ad absurdum of the
Kedroff reasoning to remark that it permits of higher church authorities
the perpetration of fraud and deceit on their adherents, for alone as a
self-limitation of the decision was something unfortunately sounding in
cclear and present danger." The Court appeared unconcerned with the
Soviet communist influence in the affairs of the Russian church. That
disposition is not surprising, for the institutional application of consti-
tutional liberties leads logically to a stultification of the great Anglo-
American concepts of property rights, among which is free contract,
and the application thereto of common law concepts of fraud, deceit,
duress, and the other developments which contribute to a well-ordered
but free society.
121 Compare cases dealing with the efforts of Anglicans who discarded the
control of the Church of England in favor of the Episcopal Church. No cases
suggested the illegality of that move. Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1
(1871). Cf. Presbyterian Congregation v. Johnston, 1 W. & S. 9 (Pa. 1841).
122 The 1957 judgment of trial term dismissing the complaint on the ground
that the Moscow patriarch was the head of a functioning church organization is
most unpersuasive, and to this writer, shockingly inconsiderate of the American
faction's practical inability to acquire evidence to support its allegations of
communist influence. The burden of proof would appear to have been met; but
aside from that, the Soviet government obviously was not prepared to admit
American churchmen to gather evidence to support a position inimical to propa-
ganda interests of the Soviet dictatorship. 276 App. Div. 309, 166 N.Y.S.2d 245
(1957).
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